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The U.S. dollar holds a dominant place in the invoicing of international trade, along two complementary
dimensions. First, most U.S. exports and imports invoiced in dollars. Second, trade flows that do not
involve the United States are also substantially invoiced in dollars, an aspect that has received relatively
little attention. Using a simple center-periphery model, we show that the second dimension magnifies
the exposure of periphery countries to the center's monetary policy, even when direct trade flows between
the center and the periphery are limited. When intra-periphery trade volumes are sensitive to the center's
monetary policy, the model predicts substantial welfare gains from coordinated monetary policy. Our
model also shows that even though exchange rate movements are not fully efficient, flexible exchange
rates are a central component of optimal policy.
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The prominent role of the U.S. dollar in the invoicing of international
trade transaction is a major feature of the global economy.1 Its role encom-
passes two dimensions presented in Goldberg and Tille (2005). The ￿rst
relates to trade ￿ ows to and from the United States, which are overwhelm-
ingly invoiced in dollars. The second dimension is its sizable role as a ￿ vehicle
invoicing currency￿in trade ￿ ows that do not involve the United States.
This paper analyzes how these two dimensions of the international role of
a vehicle currency a⁄ect the international transmission of shocks and policy,
with a focus on the second dimension that has received a limited attention
in the literature despite its empirical relevance. International trade invoicing
is recognized as a central aspect in international economics, as it a⁄ects
the extent to which exchange rate movements impact international relative
prices, the so-called exchange rate pass-through, and lead to demand switches
across goods produced in di⁄erent countries. This in turn is a central element
in the design of monetary policy in open economies.2
Most existing studies focus on a symmetric setting where the degree of
exchange rate pass-through is the same for all trade ￿ ows. Evidence of asym-
metry in exchange rate pass-through, however, abounds between the U.S. and
the Euro area countries with their respective trade partners, as documented
by Campa and Goldberg (2005), Faruque (2006), and Ihrig et al (2006).
Some contributions consider such asymmetries and show substantial impli-
cations for the design of policy (Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a,b, Devereux, Shi,
and Xu 2006). These contributions focus on two-country models which only
encompass the ￿rst dimension of the international role of a currency.
This paper analyzes both dimensions of the international role of a cur-
rency by considering a simple center-periphery model. Five main results
emerge. First, monetary policy in the center has a disproportionately large
e⁄ect on worldwide consumption in the presence of an international role for
its currency. This e⁄ect is more pronounced when the role extends to the
second dimension, in which case it is observed even in the absence of di-
rect trade ￿ ows between the center and the periphery. Second, the impact
of productivity shocks on the welfare of the various countries is a⁄ected by
the international role of the center currency, even though the optimal mon-
etary policy rules in a non-cooperative setting are not. This aspect re￿ ect
externalities of the monetary policy in the center on the periphery countries.
For instance, the center policy can lead to ine¢ cient price movements be-
1While the dollar also plays a major role in international reserve holdings and ￿nancial
markets, our analysis focuses on the invoicing of trade.
2A non-exhaustive list includes Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a), Engel and Devereux
(2003), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002).
2tween the periphery countries under the second dimension. Third, the model
predicts substantial gains from policy cooperation because of these external-
ities. Whether the cooperative policy requires the center monetary policy to
be more or less targeted to its domestic shocks depend on the exact nature of
the international role of its currency. Fourth, while both periphery countries
gain from cooperation, the gain is likely to be higher for the country which
experiences the least volatile shocks and the center has lower welfare. Fifth,
even though exchange rate movements can entail an ine¢ cient component,
exchange rate pegs are not desirable in our model.
Our emphasis on the international role of the dollar in intra-periphery
trade is consistent with the insights of Cook and Devereux (2006). They
consider a partial equilibrium model where the center is taken as exogenous,
and apply it to the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998. Their results point to the
role of the dollar in intra-Asia trade as a central feature in accounting for the
magnitude and persistence of the crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence
on the international invoicing role of the dollar and euro. Section 3 presents
a simple center-periphery model. Section 4 explores the design of optimal
monetary policy in a stochastic setup, with a numerical illustration of the
main results. Section 5 concludes and reviews potential extensions of our
simple setup.
2 Evidence on vehicle currency use in inter-
national trade
Our focus on vehicle currency use in international trade is highly relevant
in light of the international role of the dollar and the emerging role of the euro.
These are documented in Tables 1 and 2, which present data on invoicing
from Goldberg and Tille (2005) and ECB publications, and on international
trade transactions.
Table 1 documents the international use of the dollar as an invoicing
currency. Column (1) shows the share of exports invoiced in dollar for several
countries. Column (2) presents the share of exports going to the United
States, while column (3) shows the share of exports sold to the United States
and ￿dollar bloc￿ countries which keep their currency stable vis-a-vis the
dollar. Column (3)-(6) show the corresponding numbers on the import side,
providing evidence of dollar use in intra-periphery trade.
Looking across countries, the use of the dollar in invoicing goes well be-
yond the role of the United States as a direct trade counterparty. While
adding exports to the dollar block countries reduces the discrepancy for some
countries, a large gap remains between the use of the dollar and the share
3of exports to dollar bloc countries. The vehicle currency role of the dollar is
especially striking for Asian countries: more than 80 percent of the exports
of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are invoiced in dollars, while the United
States accounts for at most one-￿fth of these countries exports, and export to
dollar countries account for between one-third and one half of their trade. A
similar pattern is observed for Eastern European accession countries. Cook
and Devereux (2006) similarly emphasize the role of the dollar in the invoic-
ing of trade between Asian countries. The data on imports show a similar
pattern, perhaps relecting dollar use in invoicing trade in commodities and
raw materials.
Table 2 shows a similar exercise for the use of the euro as an invoicing
currency. The values for the countries in the Euro area in column (1) and
(4) are for the trade ￿ ows outside the Euro Area, and the values in columns
(3) and (6) are only for the "euro block" countries. The table shows that
Asian economies seldom use euros for invoicing export or import transactions.
Country proximity to the euro area plays a substantial role in explaining the
use of euros in international trade transactions, as does the possibility of
joining the euro area.3 For these countries, trade with the center and other
periphery countries are largely conducted in euros.
3 A simple center-periphery model
3.1 Geographical structure and timing
We use a three-country variant of the workhorse ￿ new open economy
macroeconomics￿model introduced by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995), focusing
on the novel elements and the corresponding intuitive interpretations.4 The
world is comprised of three countries: A, B; and C. Country A represents
a "center" country, while countries B and C are "periphery" countries. We
focus on symmetric sizes between the center and the periphery, as well as
within the periphery. Country A accounts for half the world, while each
periphery country represents a quarter of the world. There is a continuum of
di⁄erentiated brands available for consumption, indexed along a unit interval.
Firms in country A produce brands on the 0 ￿ 0:5 interval, ￿rms in country
B produce brands on the 0:5￿0:75 interval, and ￿rms in country C produce
brands on the 0:75 ￿ 1 interval.
Each country is inhabited by a representative consumer who purchases
all brands available in the world economy. In terms of notation, consumption
levels are indexed with a subscript for the country where consumption takes
3Goldberg and Tille (2006), Goldberg (2007), ECB (2006), Kamps (2006),
4A detailed exposition of the technical steps is found in an Appendix available on
request
4place, and a superscript for the country where the good is produced. Specif-
ically, C
j
i (z) is the consumption in country i of the brand z produced in
country j. Individual brands are aggregated into indexes, as detailed below,
and C
j
i is the consumption in country i of the index of all brands produced
in country j. The indexes themselves are aggregated further into the overall
consumption, with Ci being the overall consumption index in country i.
The prices of the various goods are indexes along similar lines. P
j
i (z)
is the price paid by the consumers in country i for each unit of brand z
produced in country j. The prices of the various brands produced in a given
country are aggregated into a country-of-origin price index, with P
j
i being
the price index charged in country i for the brands produced in country j.
These indexes are in turn aggregated in the overall consumer price index
Pi. Prices are expressed in the currency of the country where the goods are
consumed, namely i.
We consider a one-period stochastic model. The good-producing ￿rms
set their prices at the beginning of the period. The various shocks then
occur, and the monetary authorities react to them, leading to movements in
exchange rates and, possibly, import prices. Consumption and production
then take place. The ex-post output is demand-driven, with ￿rms meeting
the demand they face at their preset prices. While ￿rms set prices ex-ante
and cannot adjust them following shocks, their forward-looking pricing takes
account of the potential distribution of shocks and the monetary policy rules.
5
3.2 Consumption allocation
We allow for home bias in consumption between the center and periphery
goods. Speci￿cally, the representative consumer in country A allocates her



















5While our static model can appear restrictive, the functional forms used imply that a
dynamic version boils down to a succession of static models (Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a).
The functional form also ensures full international risk sharing.
5The elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di⁄erent countries




















































￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between brands produced in the same
country. Similarly, the representative consumer in a periphery country B or
C allocates her consumption across the various brands to maximize:















2 i = B, C (2)
The coe¢ cient ￿ 2 [0:5;1] in (1)-(2) re￿ ects the degree of home bias,
in terms of periphery vs. center goods. It plays a central role by allowing
us to vary the degree of integration between the center and the periphery.
One extreme (￿ = 0:5) corresponds to a fully integrated world where con-
sumers in all countries have similar consumption baskets. The other extreme
(￿ = 1) corresponds to a disconnected world characterized by the absence
of trade between the center and the periphery. Under intermediate values
of ￿, the consumer in the center countries purchases mostly domestic goods,
while the basket of consumers in either periphery country is tilted towards
periphery-made goods. The home bias is de￿ned solely in terms of center
vs. periphery, and there is no corresponding bias between goods produced
within the periphery.
The allocation of consumption is computed following the usual steps and
re￿ ects relative prices. For instance, the allocation of purchases by the con-
sumer in country A is:
C
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CA j = B, C














6The price indexes represent the minimal expenditure required to purchase one
unit of the corresponding index. The allocation of consumption in country
B and C is computed along similar lines, with the consumer price index in













2 i = B;C (4)
3.3 Money and e⁄ort
The consumer in country i maximizes a simple utility function over con-










i = A, B, C (5)
where E denotes the expectation operator from the point of view of the be-
ginning of the period. Ci is the aggregate consumption index, Mi=Pi denotes
real money balances and Hi denotes the hours worked by the consumer. ￿
and ￿ are scaling parameters. The simple functional form in (5) allows us
to derive our results with a minimal amount of technical complexity. The
budget constraint faced by the consumer is:
PiCi + Mi = ￿i + WiHi ￿ Ti (6)
where ￿i denotes the pro￿ts of the ￿rms in country i, which are owned by
the local consumer, Wi is the wage rate, and Ti is a lump-sum tax paid to
the government of country i.6 The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to real
balances and hours worked lead to the money demand and labor supply:
Mi = ￿PiCi Wi = ￿PiCi = (￿=￿)Mi (7)
3.4 Structure of pricing
We choose to focus on how alternative patterns of trade invoicing alter
the transmission of monetary policy and its optimal design, and take the
pattern of invoicing to be exogenous throughout the paper. While a growing
literature has focused on the determinants of invoicing the models considered
go beyond our simple setup.7 For instance, the literature points to a key role
for decreasing returns to scale in invoicing decisions. A convex cost of pro-
duction implies that volatile demand translates into a high marginal cost on
average, giving ￿rms an incentive to stabilize demand through their invoicing
6Without loss of generality we assume that initial cash holdings are zero.
7See for instance Bacchetta and vanWincoop (2005), Devereux, Engel and Storegaard
(2004), Goldberg and Tille (2005).
7strategy. We abstract from this aspect and consider constant returns to scale
to keep the technical complexity to a minimum.8 Encompassing endogenous
invoicing choice in our analysis would require a richer model, a step that we
leave for future research.
Firms set the price for domestic sales in the domestic currency. We de-
note the price set by a ￿rm located in country j for domestic sales by ~ P
j
j (z).
By contrast, prices for sales abroad can be invoiced in di⁄erent currencies.
Speci￿cally, a ￿rm invoices its export in a basket currency that consists of
the currencies of all three countries. The weights of the currencies in the
basket, which are restricted to be in the [0;1] interval, are denoted by ￿ with
a subscript indicating the country of destination, as well as superscripts indi-
cating the country of production and the currency of invoicing. Speci￿cally
￿
j; cur k
i is the share of currency k in the invoicing of exports from country j
to country i. These exogenous invoicing weights are the same for all ￿rms in
the exporting country. The price paid by the consumer in country i, in her
own currency, then consists of the preset price in the basket currency, ~ P
j
i (z),


























where Si is the exchange rate between the center￿ s currency A and currency
i. It is expressed as the amount of currency A per unit of currency i, so an
increase corresponds to a bilateral depreciation of currency A. The exchange
rate between currency i and currency k, in terms of the amount of currency
i per unit of currency k, is then given by Sk=Si.
Our speci￿cation of invoicing in a basket currency provides us with a
general approach that encompasses several standard particular cases. For
instance, the case of "producer currency pricing" (PCP), under which ex-
change rate ￿ uctuations are fully passed-through to the consumer, corre-
sponds to ￿
j; cur j
i = 1. The case of "local currency pricing" (LCP), under
which consumer prices are insulated from exchange rate movements, corre-
sponds to ￿
j; cur i






For brevity, we consider ￿ve corner cases of invoicing, as illustrated by
Figure 1. For each case the arrows represent the trade ￿ ows between the
various countries along with the invoicing currency (for instance a label C
8Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) analyze the interaction between policy rules and the in-
voicing decisions while assuming constant returns to scale. While they show the possibility
of multiple equilibria, the only stable has ￿rms setting their prices fully in their own cur-
rency.
8on the arrow from country C to country A indicates that exports from C
to A are invoiced in the currency of country C). We refer to the ￿rst two
cases as symmetric cases, as there is either full exchange rate pass-through
(PCP-SYM case) or no exchange rate pass-through (LCP-SYM case) for all
trade ￿ ows. We do not focus on these cases are they are the standard ones
in the literature.
The next two cases capture the ￿rst dimension of the international role
of the center currency A, namely its use as the invoicing currency for all
trade ￿ ows that involve the center. The two cases di⁄er by the extent to
which intra-periphery trade is invoiced in the producer or consumer currency,
with either full pass-through (DOL-PCP case) or no pass-through (DOL-
LCP case). The ￿nal case (DOL-DOL) captures the second dimension of
the international role of the center currency A, as trade ￿ ows within the
periphery are also invoiced in that currency. A central feature of that case is
the impact of exchange rate ￿ uctuations between currency A and periphery
currencies on the price of intra-periphery imports relative to local goods in
the periphery. Our analyzes focuses on the last three cases, with particular
emphasis on DOL-DOL.
3.5 Technology and output
Firms use a simple technology with constant returns to scale over labor
hours worked in production of good z, Hi (z):
Yi (z) = KiHi (z) i = A;B;C (9)
The country-wide productivity terms Ki are subject to random shocks, and
￿rms set their prices before the realization of these shocks. For simplicity,
we adopt the standard assumption that productivity shocks are log-normal,
with mean zero. The demands faced by the various ￿rms are computed by
aggregating across the various agents the derived allocation of consumption.
Using the pricing structure detailed above, the output of a ￿rm producing
brand z in country A is equated to demand by consumers in A,B, and C

















































The demands faced by ￿rms in country B and C are computed similarly. In
equilibrium all ￿rms in a given country are identical. We can then drop the



















We abstract from government spending and assume that the seigniorage
income from monetary creation is repaid to the domestic households as lump








(12) shows that exchange rates are fully determined by the relative mone-
tary stances, a feature that is common to the various contributions in the
literature. 9
3.7 The ￿ exible price allocation
A useful benchmark is given by the situation where goods prices are fully
￿ exible. If ￿rms can adjust their prices following the realization of shocks
and the response by monetary authorities, prices are a constant markup over
marginal cost (wage adjusted for productivity). Using the labor supply (7),
the price set by a ￿rm in country j for sales to country i in terms of country











(13) shows that the law of one price holds, as a given good sells for the same
price in any country. This price re￿ ects the ratio between the monetary
stance in country j and productivity.
The ability of ￿rms to reset prices implies that productivity shocks are
fully transmitted to output, with no impact on hours worked. Consumptions
are driven by weighted averages of productivity shocks, with the weights
corresponding to the shares of the various goods in the consumption baskets
(1)-(2). Abstracting from the direct impact of real balances on utility, the
utility (5) is the same in all three countries and re￿ ects structural parameters:
Ui,￿exible prices = E [ln(Ci) ￿ ￿Hi] = ￿ (14)







9A shortcoming of this result is that the model implies a volatility of exchange rate well
below the one observed in the data . This does not alter the focus of the paper, and can be
addressed by the inclusion of shocks to the money demand. Such shocks add complexity
to our solutions but do not alter our resulting conclusions.
103.8 Optimal price setting
When prices have to be set in advance, a ￿rm in country j sets its prices
in order to maximize the expected discounted value of its pro￿ts. As all ￿rms
are domestically owned, the discount factor is the marginal utility of income
in country j. Using the pass-through structure (8), the labor supply (7) and
the solution for the exchange rate (12), the home country price set by a ￿rm
























The optimal preset price (15) is conceptually similar to the optimal ￿ exible
price (13). Prices are again set as a markup over marginal cost, which is a
ratio between monetary stances and the productivity of the ￿rm. (15) shows
that the expected marginal cost is relevant, as opposed to its realized value
in (13). In addition, the marginal cost in (15) re￿ ects a weighted average of
the monetary stances in all countries, re￿ ecting their role in the invoicing of
trade, while only the domestic monetary stance matters in (13). The later
point of course does not apply to domestic sales which are fully invoiced in
the domestic currency: ￿
j; cur j
j = 1, ￿
j; cur k6=j
j = 0.
4 The design of monetary policy
4.1 The prominent role of the center
Before computing the ex-ante rule through which monetary policy should
respond to shocks, it is useful to compute the ex-post impact of monetary
policies of each country on consumption. Using the money demand (7), the
consumer price indexes (3)-(4), the pass-through structure (8) and the solu-
tion for the exchange rate (12), consumption in country i takes the following
form:








i￿ s are coe¢ cients that re￿ ect the pattern of invoicing and the
term ￿i re￿ ects the preset components of prices, ~ P
j
i , in (8).10 While ￿i
is not a⁄ected ex-post by the realization of shocks and monetary stances,
it does re￿ ect the impact of ex-ante policy rules on the level at which the
forward looking-prices are set (15). (16) shows that productivity shocks have
no direct ex-post impact on consumption, a standard result in models with
preset prices.
10The exact values of the various ￿
i￿ s and ￿i can be found in the technical appendix.
11The impact of monetary policy (the ￿
i￿ s) re￿ ects the extent to which con-
sumer prices in country i are invoiced in currency j: if no prices are invoiced
in currency j, then consumption in country i is fully insulated from move-
ments in the monetary stance in country j.11 A direct implication is that a
currency with an international role has a relatively large impact on consump-
tion across the world. We illustrate this point by considering a worldwide
measure of consumption, computed as a weighted average of consumptions




Aggregate measures of ￿W and MW are constructed along similar lines.
Result 1 In the presence of an international role for the center currency,
the center￿ s monetary policy has an impact on worldwide consumption that
exceeds the size of the center country. This aspect is more marked when the
international role extends to the second dimension of intra-periphery trade.
Under the symmetric cases, the worldwide impact of the monetary stance
in each country simply re￿ ects its size: CW = ￿WMW. In the presence of an
international role for currency A, its monetary policy has a disproportionately
large impact, especially when its currency is used in the invoicing of intra-
periphery trade (the second dimension). Conversely, monetary policy in the





















Intuitively, a monetary expansion in country A depreciates its currency, as
shown by (12). Under the ￿rst dimension of the international role, this boosts
its exports to the periphery, with no o⁄setting contraction of its imports.
Under the second dimension of the international role, the depreciation lowers
the price paid by the consumer in a periphery country for goods produced in
the other periphery country, leading to a boost in intra-periphery trade.
11For instance, we can show that the coe¢ cients for consumption in country B are:
￿
B






























12While the relatively large impact of the center monetary stance relies on
trade ￿ ows between the center and the periphery under the ￿rst dimension,
this is not the case under the second dimension. Even if the center and the
periphery are completely disconnected (￿ = 1), the impact through intra-
periphery trade remains. Result 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows
the impact of a 1 percent increase in MA on worldwide consumption, CW,
depending on the degree of integration, ￿. The impact simply re￿ ects the
size of country A under the symmetric cases. The impact is larger when there
is an international role, especially when it extends to the second dimension.
4.2 Impact of monetary policy stance
The goal of monetary policy is to maximize some combination of the
welfare of the representative agents in the various countries, given by (5).
We take the standard approach of ignoring the small direct impact of real
balances on welfare and focusing on consumption and hours:
Ui = E ln(Ci) ￿ ￿EHi (17)
Under our speci￿cation, expected hours worked boil down to a simple func-
tion of the structural parameters of the economy, regardless of the structure of
invoicing, a well-known feature of such models (Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a):
￿EHi = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿. The welfare (17) can then be assessed by focusing on
the consumption component. The welfare of agent in country i is given by
taking the expected value of the log of (16), and explicitly writing the preset
prices in ￿i by using the optimal pricing rule (15). The key element is that
the preset prices are a⁄ected by the expected monetary stances, as shown by
(15).
The ￿rst step towards setting the optimal monetary stance is to compute
the marginal impact of monetary policy in a given state of nature s on the
expected log of consumption. The resulting derivatives can be expressed in
terms of log-linear approximations around a steady state where productivity
is constant. Denoting such log deviations by San-Serif variables, the mar-
ginal impact of monetary stance in country A in state s on the expected log
consumption in country A is written as:
@E ln(CA)
@MA;s



























A mA;s + ￿C cur B
A mB;s
+￿C cur C
A mC;s ￿ kC;s
￿
13where ￿s is the probability of state s being realized. Similar expressions can
be derived for the marginal impact of the monetary stance in any country
on the expected log consumption in any country.
Intuitively, (18) re￿ ects the forward looking pricing of ￿rms (15). Con-
sider the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (18). If in state s the monetary
stance in country A expands beyond productivity (mA;s > kA;s), the wage
paid by ￿rms rises beyond productivity and they face a higher marginal cost.
This induces them to charge a high price ex-ante, with the magnitude re-
￿ ecting the probability that state s occurs. A high preset price then reduces
consumption in all states of the world, especially when domestic goods ac-
count for a large share of the consumption basket, explaining the negative
impact of mA;s ￿ kA;s in (18). The last two terms on the right-hand side
of (18) re￿ ect a similar aspect for imported goods, for which the expected
marginal cost re￿ ects the various world currencies, to the extent that they
are used in invoicing the goods imported by country A.
The optimal monetary policy is computed by setting some combination
of the marginal impacts similar to (18) to zero, with di⁄erent objectives
translating into di⁄erent combinations as detailed below. We refer to the
resulting log linear relation between the monetary stance and the various
shocks as a policy rule. Our analysis focuses on the design of optimal policy
rules and we abstract from the issue of discretionary policy. Under our
assumption of lognormality for the various shocks, the expected log deviations
are zero (Eki = 0) and the linear rule implies a similar result for the monetary
stances (Emi = 0).
Using the forward looking prices (15), the welfare in the various countries
can be written in terms of the variances of the monetary stances and shocks,
as well as the invoicing structure. For instance, the welfare in country A is:
^ UA = ￿￿
1
2










A mA + ￿
B; cur B
A mB + ￿
B; cur C












A mA + ￿
C cur B
A mB + ￿
C cur C
A mC ￿ kC
i
where V ar denotes the variance. ^ UA is expressed relative to the welfare
under ￿ exible prices (14), with ^ UA = 0 indicating that the welfare under
preset prices corresponds to the level under ￿ exible prices. (14) shows that
the best potential outcome for monetary policy is to set all variance to zero
and brings the economy to the allocation that prevails under ￿ exible prices.
The similarity of the various terms in (18) and (19) highlights the role
of policy rule in the determination of forward-looking prices. Consider the
￿rst term on the right-hand side of (19). If the monetary stance in country
14A does not move in line with productivity in various states (mA;s 6= kA;s),
￿rms face volatile marginal cost as wages sometimes di⁄er from productivity
(V ar[mA ￿ kA] > 0). This induces them to charge a higher price ex-ante,
thereby reducing consumption in all states, and lowering welfare. A similar
interpretation applies to the last two terms on the right-hand side of (19)
which capture the volatility of marginal costs for foreign ￿rms selling goods
in country A, with the weights on the various monetary stances re￿ ecting the
invoicing structure. The welfare level under speci￿c monetary policy rules is
computed by substituting the rules into (19).
4.3 Optimal monetary policy in a decentralized setting
4.3.1 Monetary rules
We ￿rst consider a decentralized Nash equilibrium where each monetary
authority focuses on maximizing the welfare of its own residents only, and
ignores any impact on the welfare of residents in other countries. The policy










This gives a linear system of three equations in three unknowns, mi;s for
i = A;B;C and three exogenous productivity shocks. For convenience, we
de￿ne the following periphery-wide measure of shocks:
kP;s = (kB;s + kC;s)=2
Result 2 In the symmetric cases, decentralized monetary policy o⁄sets
domestic shocks when there is full exchange rate pass-through, and o⁄sets
a combination of worldwide shocks that re￿ect the composition of the local
consumption basket when there is no pass-through.
This result is standard in the literature. Under complete exchange rate
pass-through, the monetary authority in a country can only stabilize the
marginal cost of its own producers, and has no in￿ uence on the costs of for-
eign ￿rms selling in the country. The optimal policy then fully stabilizes the
marginal cost of domestic ￿rms (mi;s = ki;s, i = A, B, C). When import
prices are fully insulated from exchange rate movements, the monetary au-
thority a⁄ects the volatility of marginal cost of foreign ￿rms selling in the
country. The optimal policy then re￿ ect a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing the
cost of domestic and foreign producers who sells in the country:
mA;s = ￿kA;s + (1 ￿ ￿)kP;s , mB;s = mC;s = (1 ￿ ￿)kA;s + ￿kP;s
15Result 3 In the presence of an international role of the center currency,
the center￿ s monetary policy targets a combination of worldwide shocks which
re￿ect the composition of the consumption basket of the center.
The international role of currency A implies that all goods sold in the
country are invoiced in currency A, whether or not the international role
extends to the second dimension. All the terms in (19) then re￿ ect the
monetary stance in the center mA. Monetary policy then trades-o⁄ the sta-
bilization of marginal costs of domestic ￿rms, V ar[mA ￿ kA], versus foreign
￿rms V ar[mA ￿ kB] and V ar[mA ￿ kC]:
mA;s = ￿kA;s + (1 ￿ ￿)kP;s (20)
Result 4 Under the ￿rst dimension of the international role of the center
currency, monetary policy in the periphery depends on the extent of intra-
periphery pass-through. Periphery policy fully targets domestic shocks under
complete pass-through, and targets the periphery-wide average of shocks in
the absence of pass-through.
When intra-periphery trade ￿ ows are fully a⁄ected by exchange rate
movements, the optimal policy fully stabilizes the marginal cost of domestic
￿rms: mi;s = ki;s, i = B, C. Intuitively, the monetary authorities cannot af-
fect the marginal cost of ￿rms in the center or in the other periphery country,
as they re￿ ect solely the local monetary stances. Their only impact is on the
marginal cost of domestic ￿rms, on which they focus. The situation is di⁄er-
ent when import prices from the other periphery country are insulated from
exchange rate movements. While the monetary authority still has no impact
on the marginal cost of ￿rms in the center, it a⁄ects the costs of ￿rms in the
other periphery country. The optimal policy then trades-o⁄the stabilization
of marginal cost in the two periphery countries: mi;s = kP;s, i = B, C.
Result 5 In the presence of an international role of the center currency,
monetary policy in any periphery country focuses solely on domestic shocks.
When all import prices are invoiced in the center currency, the monetary
authority in a periphery country has no impact on the marginal cost of
foreign ￿rms. It only a⁄ects the cost of domestic ￿rms, and fully focuses on
stabilizing them: mi;s = ki;s, i = B, C.
Our analysis stresses the asymmetric form of monetary policy rules be-
tween the center and the periphery in the presence of an international role for
the center￿ s currency, an aspect indicated by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b)
and Devereux, Shi, and Xu (2006) who focus on the ￿rst dimension of the
international role.
16The various policy rules can be concisely illustrated through the volatility
of exchange rates. For brevity, we focus on the case where the shocks are
perfectly correlated across the periphery countries (kC = kB).
Result 6 In the presence of an international role of the center currency,
the volatility of the exchange rate falls in between the extremes of the sym-
metric cases with and without pass-through, regardless of whether the inter-
national role includes the second dimension or not.
In the symmetric cases, the exchange rate moves is line with the rela-
tive productivity shocks in the center and the periphery when there is full
exchange rate pass-through. It ￿ uctuates much less in the absence of pass-
through:
V ar(sB)PCP-SYM = V ar[kA ￿ kB]
V ar(sB)LCP-SYM = (2￿ ￿ 1)
2 V ar[kA ￿ kB]
In the presence of an international role for currency A, the volatility of the
exchange rate falls in between the two extremes (2￿ ￿ 1 < ￿ < 1):
V ar(sB)DOL = ￿
2V ar[kA ￿ kB]
Intuitively, the volatility of the exchange rate re￿ ects its ability to alter
relative prices. This ability is at its highest when all trade ￿ ows are charac-
terized by complete pass-through, leading policy makers to extensively rely
on the exchange rate to deliver optimal relative prices. When the exchange
rate has no impact on any import prices, its usefulness is limited and policy
makers do not engineer large variations. In the presence of an international
role for the center currency, the situation is in between the symmetric ex-
tremes. While exchange rate movements do not a⁄ect relative prices in the
center, they do a⁄ect relative prices in the periphery with a depreciation of
the center currency reducing the cost of center goods.
4.3.2 Welfare
A striking result of our analysis so far is that the monetary policy rules are
little a⁄ected by the second dimension of the international role of the center
currency. Indeed, when periphery shocks are perfectly correlated (kC = kB),
the optimal policy for a periphery country is always to focus on domestic
shocks, whether or not the international role of the center currency encom-
passes the second dimension. The point is even more striking for the center
since its optimal monetary policy rule is never a⁄ected by the use of the
center currency in intra-periphery trade. While one may infer that the sec-
ond dimension is not an interesting aspect of international interdependence,
this inference is inaccurate for two reasons. First, monetary policy rules
17are a⁄ected by the second dimension when we consider a cooperative policy
outcome, as shown below. Second, the same rules have very di⁄erent impli-
cations for welfare depending on whether the extent of international role of
the center currency, an aspect to which we now turn.
As the symmetric cases have already been analyzed by existing contribu-
tions, we brie￿ y remind the reader of their characteristics. When exchange
rate pass-through is complete, monetary policy is able to fully replicate the
￿ exible price outcome as exchange rate movements generate e¢ cient adjust-
ments in relative prices. This is not the case in the absence of pass-through,
where the rigidity of prices reduces welfare.
Focusing on case with an international role for the center currency, the
welfare depends on the volatility of relative shocks between the center and
the periphery, V ar[kA ￿ kP], as well as between the periphery countries,
V ar[kB ￿ kC].
Result 7 In the presence of an international role of the center currency,
welfare in the center is reduced, whether the role includes the second dimen-
sion or not.
The welfare cost for the center re￿ ects the fact that relative prices are fully
insulated from exchange rate movements, and cannot e¢ ciently adjust to
re￿ ect productivity di⁄erentials, both between the center and the periphery
and between periphery countries:
^ UA = ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2
V ar[kA ￿ kP] ￿
1 ￿ ￿
8
V ar[kB ￿ kC]
Result 8 Under the ￿rst dimension of the international role of the center
currency, welfare is equalized across the periphery countries. Welfare is ad-
versely a⁄ected by the volatility of relative center-periphery shocks due to the
fact that the center monetary authority does not take account of its impact
on prices in the periphery. In addition, relative intra-periphery shocks are
costly in the absence of intra-periphery pass-through.
Welfare for both periphery countries is only a⁄ected by the volatility of


















V ar[kA ￿ kP] ￿
￿
8
V ar[kB ￿ kC]
The adverse impact of relative shocks between the center and the periphery
re￿ ects the monetary rule in the center. In the presence of an international
18role for the center currency, the monetary authorities in the center do not
fully o⁄set domestic shocks (20). A productivity boom in the center is then
only accompanied by a moderate depreciation of the currency. While that
depreciation has an e¢ cient impact on the periphery by lowering the cost of
goods made in the center, this impact remains ine¢ ciently low as the center
monetary authority ignores intra-periphery consequences.
In addition, movements in the intra-periphery productivity di⁄erential are
costly in the absence of pass-through, as relative prices then cannot adjust
to switch demand towards the more productive country. No such cost occurs
under full pass-through, as relative prices then adjust in an e¢ cient way.
Result 9 Under the second dimension of the international role of the
center currency, movements in the center-periphery welfare di⁄erential en-
tail an additional welfare cost. When a periphery country faces more volatile
domestic shocks, its welfare is increased relative to the other periphery coun-
try.









































V ar[kA ￿ kP] ￿
￿
16
V ar[kB ￿ kC]
Relative shocks between the center and the periphery are more costly under
the second dimension because they lead to ine¢ cient movements in intra-
periphery relative prices. Following an increase in productivity in the center,
the monetary authority there follows an expansionary policy which depreci-
ates the center￿ s currency. This reduces the prices of intra-periphery imports
in the periphery, which is ine¢ cient as there has been no change in pro-
ductivity within the periphery. Movements the intra-periphery productivity
di⁄erential also entail a cost, as relative prices cannot e¢ ciently respond
because import prices are set in the center currency.
Assuming that the shocks in the center and the periphery are not corre-














(V ar[kB] ￿ V ar[kC])
How can a country be better o⁄ when it faces more volatile shocks? This
surprising result re￿ ects the fact that under the second dimension, monetary
19policy in the periphery is better suited at o⁄setting domestic shocks than
foreign ones. For clarity, consider the case where productivity is volatile
in country B but not in country C. This volatility directly feeds into the
marginal cost and prices of ￿rms located in country B. This adverse e⁄ect
can however be o⁄set for country B, but not for country C. Speci￿cally,
the impact on consumer prices in country B is through the price of domestic
goods, which is proportional to V ar[mB ￿ kB]. The monetary authority in
country B can then use policy to limit the impact of the volatile shocks on
the marginal cost of its producers. No such recourse is available for country
C where the cost of goods imported from country B re￿ ects V ar[mA ￿ kB],
due to the fact that these goods are invoiced in the center currency. This
problem does not emerge when the international role is limited to the ￿rst
dimension, as the authorities in country C can either directly stabilize the
cost (in the DOL-LCP case) or also bene￿t from the stabilization e⁄ort of
the monetary authority in country B (in the DOL-PCP case).
Our analysis shows that while the second dimension of the international
role of the center currency has a limited impact on the conduct of monetary
policy in a decentralized setting, it substantially a⁄ects the welfare in the
various countries. Our results are illustrated by means of a simple example
that focuses on the cases with an international role for the center currency
and emphasizes the impact of the degree of center-periphery integration ￿.
We ￿rst focus on the role of productivity di⁄erentials between the center
and the periphery by assuming that productivity shocks in country B and
country C are perfectly correlated and equally volatile, but are independent
from shocks in the center. We set the standard deviation of productivity
shocks at 5% for all countries, leading to a standard deviation for the center-
periphery productivity di⁄erential of 7%.
The welfare levels under a decentralized policy are presented in Figure 3,
where the dotted line shows the welfare for the center. When the interna-
tional role of the center currency is limited to the ￿rst dimension, the welfare
is higher in the periphery countries (dashed lines) than in the center. This
re￿ ects the fact that exchange rate movements lead to ￿ uctuations in relative
prices in the periphery that are partially e¢ cient. Introducing the second
dimension reduces the welfare in the periphery (solid line), as ￿ uctuations in
the value of the center currency now lead to ine¢ cient movements in import
prices in the periphery. When the center and the periphery are not tightly
connected (￿ is high), the adverse impact of center-periphery exchange rate
movements on the intra-periphery relative prices dominate their bene￿t on
the center-periphery relative prices, making the periphery countries worse
o⁄.
We next assess the impact of asymmetric shocks in the periphery. We still
assume that shocks are perfectly correlated across periphery countries, but
20take them to be twice as volatile in country B as in country C. Speci￿cally,
we set the standard deviation of shocks in country B and C at 6:6% and 3:3%
respectively. With the standard deviation of shocks in the center kept at 5%,
this ensures that the standard deviation of the center-periphery productivity
di⁄erential remains at 7%, while the standard deviation of the intra-periphery
productivity di⁄erential, kB ￿ kC, is equal to 3:3%.
The welfare under a decentralized monetary policy is shown in Figure
4, with panels A and B focusing on the ￿rst and second dimension of the
international role, respectively. Under the ￿rst dimension, there is no welfare
gap between the periphery countries, and the volatility of the intra-periphery
productivity di⁄erential lowers the welfare in the absence of intra-periphery
pass-through. A welfare gap emerges under the second dimension (panel B)
in favor of the volatile periphery country. This gap is larger when the center
and the periphery are not tightly connected, as imports from the rest of the
periphery then account for a larger share of the consumption basket in a
periphery country.
4.4 Optimal monetary policy in a cooperative setting
4.4.1 Monetary rules
Our analysis shows that the monetary policy of the center has a sub-
stantial impact on the periphery as it leads to partially e¢ cient movements
in center-periphery relative prices, and ine¢ cient ones for intra-periphery
relative prices. While sizable, these aspects are ignored by the monetary
authority in the center as they do not impact the welfare of the center. The
presence of this externality points to a bene￿t, in our setting, from coopera-
tion in the conduct of monetary policy.
Consider a global cooperation setup in which monetary authorities in any
country choose their rule to maximize the weighted average of the welfare of
various consumers:
0 =
@E ln(CA) + 1
2@E [ln(CB) + ln(CC)]
@Mi;s
i = A, B, C
As in the decentralized setup, this gives a linear system of three equations
in three unknowns, mi;s for i = A;B;C and three exogenous productivity
shocks.12 We again focus on the cases with an international role for the
center currency, as there are no gain from cooperation in the symmetric
cases, as shown by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a).
12As the externality is linked to the monetary policy of the center, cooperation can be
bene￿cial only if it involves the center. We can show that a cooperation limited to the
periphery countries leads to the same policy rules and welfare as under the decentralized
poilicy.
21Result 10 The monetary policy rules for the periphery countries are not
a⁄ected by a cooperative monetary policy setting.
Whether policy is conducted in a decentralized or cooperative setting, the
monetary rules for the periphery countries are the same as derived above. In-
tuitively, this re￿ ects the absence of externalities in the decentralized setting,
as the monetary authority in a periphery country sets its policy by taking
full account of its impact on all prices.13
Result 11 Under the ￿rst dimension of the international role of the cen-
ter currency, cooperation calls for monetary policy in the center to be more
inward-looking than under a decentralized setting.











Contrasting (20) and (21) shows that the monetary authorities in the center
are more inward-looking under the cooperative setting, with their own shocks




Intuitively, a monetary expansion in the center following a center productivity
improvement leads to a depreciation of the center￿ s currency against both
periphery currencies, lowering import prices in the periphery. This e¢ cient
response is ignored by the center monetary authorities in the decentralized
setting, but taken into account in the cooperative setting.
Result 12 Under the second dimension of the international role of the
center currency, cooperation calls for monetary policy in the center to be more
inward looking only when the center and the periphery are closely linked. In
addition, the center monetary policy is less inward looking than under the
￿rst dimension alone.











Comparing (21)-(22) shows that, under a cooperative setting, the second







13More speci￿cally, even when it ignores its impact on some prices, as in the DOL-PCP
case, this does not distrot its policy choice.
22Intuitively, movements in the exchange rate between the center and the pe-
riphery countries now have an ine¢ cient impact on the intra-periphery rela-
tive prices. Limiting this costs requires a lower response of the center mon-
etary policy to its own shock, relative to the cooperative policy when only
the ￿rst dimension is present.
Comparing the decentralized (20) and cooperative (22) policies under the
second dimension highlights a trade-o⁄. The monetary policy of the cen-
ter impacts the periphery through two channels that the center ignores in
the decentralized setting. Consider a productivity improvement in the cen-
ter, leading to a monetary expansion there and a depreciation of the center
currency. First, this depreciation has a bene￿cial impact along the center-
periphery dimension, as it leads to an e¢ cient reduction in the price of center
goods sold in the periphery. Taking this channel into account calls for a larger
depreciation, i.e. a more inward-looking policy in the center. Second, the
depreciation has a detrimental impact along the intra-periphery dimension,
as it generates ine¢ cient movements in the relative prices of periphery goods.
Taking this second aspect into account requires a smaller depreciation. The
center￿ s policy under cooperation entails a trade-o⁄ between these two as-
pects. The ￿rst aspect dominates if the center and the periphery are closely
linked (￿ is low). Speci￿cally, cooperation calls for larger exchange rate
movements under the second dimension if:
2
4 ￿ ￿
> ￿ , ￿ < 0:59
4.4.2 Welfare
In the presence of an international role for the center currency, the wel-
fare of the periphery is higher under the cooperative setting, a gain that is
partially o⁄set by a cost for the center. For clarity, we present the welfare
results in terms of the gain compared to the decentralized setting.
Result 13 Under the ￿rst dimension of the international role of the center
currency, the gains from cooperation only re￿ects the productivity di⁄erential
between the center and the periphery, and are largest when the center and the
periphery are closely connected.




























V ar[kA ￿ kP] > 0(24)
i = B;C
23(23)-(24) show that when ￿ = 0:5 the gain is negative for the center and
positive for the periphery, while both are zero when ￿ = 1.
Intuitively, the gain from cooperating entirely re￿ ects the impact of the
center￿ s policy along the center-periphery dimension. This aspect re￿ ects the
extent to which productivity di⁄ers between the center and the periphery,
and not the extent to which it di⁄ers within the periphery. Also, its hinges
on the existence of direct trade links between the center and the periphery,
and becomes negligible when the two are disconnected.
Result 14 Under the second dimension of the international role of the
center currency, the gains from cooperation are not equalized across the pe-
riphery countries. The gains are largest when the center and the periphery
are not connected.
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= ￿P (￿)V ar[kA ￿ kP] (27)















































The terms ￿A (￿) and ￿P (￿) in (25)-(27) are positive for any value of ￿,
implying that cooperation boosts the welfare of the periphery countries, at
the expense of the center.
Given the complexity of (25)-(27), the analysis is facilitated by consid-
ering the numerical example introduced above. We ￿rst focus on the case
where productivity shocks in country B and country C are perfectly corre-
lated, with the welfare levels under a decentralized setting illustrated in ￿gure
3. Figure 5 shows the gains and losses from following a cooperative policy,
relative to the decentralized policy, with panel A and B focusing on the cen-
ter and the periphery, respectively. The dotted line show that under the ￿rst
24dimension the welfare gains and losses are highest when the center and the
periphery are closely integrated. The situation under the second dimension
is depicted by the solid lines, and two results emerge. First, the magnitudes
of the e⁄ects are substantially larger than under the ￿rst dimension. Sec-
ond, the gains and losses are highest when the center and the periphery are
not integrated. Intuitively, the implications for cooperative policy along the
center-periphery and intra-periphery dimensions o⁄set each other when the
two regions are closely integrated. When they are disconnected, the main
aspect is the ine¢ cient movements in intra-periphery relative prices, which
become substantial as intra-periphery imports then account for a large share
of the consumption basket of a periphery country.
(26)-(27) show that in general the welfare is not equalized between the
two periphery countries. The bracket in the second terms in (26)-(27) can
be positive or negative, depending on ￿. If shocks in the center and the




















(V ar[kB] ￿ V ar[kC])
The term in bracket is negative when the center and the periphery are loosely
integrated (speci￿cally ￿ > 0:59), in which case cooperation mostly bene￿ts
the periphery country with the least volatile shocks.
Consider for simplicity that productivity ￿ uctuates only in country B,14
and that the center and periphery fully disconnected (￿ = 1). (20) and (22)
then show that the center monetary policy is constant under a decentralized
setting, but ￿ uctuates under cooperation. The price of periphery imports
in country B is proportional to V ar[mA ￿ kC] = V ar[mA], which increases
under cooperation. By contrast, the price of periphery imports in country C
is proportional to V ar[mA ￿ kB], which is reduced under cooperation as the
monetary stance in the center then partially o⁄sets the shocks in country B.
The larger gain for the periphery country with the smaller shocks is linked
to our earlier ￿nding that this country is worse o⁄in a decentralized setting,
relative to the other periphery country. That aspect re￿ ected its inability
to in￿ uence the volatility of marginal costs of the producers in the volatile
periphery country. This problem is reduced under a cooperative setting,
as the center monetary stance then o⁄sets shocks in the volatile periphery
country to a larger extent.
Our ￿ndings can be illustrated to our earlier numerical example. We
consider that shocks are more volatile in country B, as assumed for Figure 4.
The gains from cooperation are presented in Figure 6. We focus on the gains
for the periphery under the second dimension of the international role of the
14Speci￿cally, V ar[kA] = V ar[kC] = 0.
25center currency, as all other aspects are the same as in Figure 5. Figure 6
clearly shows larger gains for the periphery country with the least volatile
shocks, especially when the center-periphery integration is limited.15
4.5 Exchange rate peg
The e¢ ciency, or lack thereof, of exchange rate movements is at the core
of our analysis. In particular, the large gains from cooperation under the
second dimension of the international role of the center currency are driven
by the ine¢ cient impact of exchange rate movements between the center and
the periphery on the intra-periphery relative prices. A natural question is
then whether welfare is increased or reduced when there is an exchange rate
peg between the periphery and the center.
Result 15 Despite the limited e¢ ciency of exchange rate movements, in
the context of our model pegging the exchange rate leads to substantial welfare
losses.
First consider the case of decentralized policy. We can show that the
center monetary rule is the same whether the periphery countries adopt a
peg or their optimal policies.16 Pegging is then clearly suboptimal as it
restricts the policy rule in the periphery and has no e⁄ect on the center. A
similar conclusion emerges in the cooperative case, assuming that the center
sets its policy taking the monetary stances in the periphery as given.
An alternative policy is to allow the center country to be a strategic
leader. Speci￿cally, each periphery country pegs its exchange rate to the
center. The center monetary authority then sets its policy to maximize the
worldwide welfare average, taking into account that its policy is matched by
the periphery countries. Such a policy essentially consists of a currency union
where monetary policy is delegated to the monetary authority of the center,
who takes the union-wide welfare into account when setting its policy. The
optimal policy then does not try to alter international relative prices, and
simply reacts to the worldwide productivity shock:
mi;s = kW;s i = A, B, C
As this policy entails no exchange rate movements, it leads to welfare levels
15The average gain between the two periphery countries correspond to the one in ￿gure
5.
16The detailed analysis is presented in an Appendix available on request.
26that are independent of the structure of invoicing. Speci￿cally:
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V ar[kB ￿ kC] i = B;C
Figure 7 shows the worldwide welfare under the second dimension of the
international role of the center currency, the case where an exchange rate peg
is the most likely to have bene￿cial e⁄ects given the cost of exchange rate
movements along the intra-periphery dimension.17 The welfare in the decen-
tralized and cooperative settings are illustrated by the dotted and thin lines,
respectively, while the thick line illustrates the welfare under the currency
union setting described above. The ￿gure shows that a currency union is the
worst of the three cases. It never leads to a more favorable outcome than the
decentralized setting, and is substantially worse than the cooperative pol-
icy. Of course, these conclusions are from the perspective of our basic macro
model of linkages and policy interdependence, which focuses on a particular
mechanism and surrounding consequences, without re￿ ecting on the broader
arguments for and against choice of exchange rates and choice of invoicing
currencies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the international role of the dollar
on macroeconomic interdependence using a simple center-periphery model.
We distinguish between two dimensions of the international role of the center
currency. In the ￿rst, the currency is used in invoicing all trade ￿ ows to and
from the center. In the second it is used as the invoicing currency for intra-
periphery trade ￿ ows, an aspect that is empirically relevant and has received
little attention in the literature. Under this second dimension, monetary
policy in the center country has a substantial impact on the periphery even
absent direct trade links. Speci￿cally, a monetary expansion in the center
depreciates its currency and makes imported goods cheaper in both periphery
countries, boosting intra-periphery trade ￿ ows.
We show that the second dimension of the international role of the cen-
ter currency has sizable implications for the design of monetary policy. A
decentralized monetary policy is suboptimal as the monetary authority of
the center ignores its impact on intra-periphery transactions. Because of this
17We focus on the case where shocks are equally volatile in the two periphery countries,
with similar results when the volatility di⁄ers.
27externality, a cooperative monetary policy can lead to a substantial improve-
ment in periphery welfare. Our analysis also shows that the gains are not
evenly spread in the periphery. They are likely to be more pronounced for
the periphery country with the least volatile shocks, which was at a disad-
vantage in a decentralized policy setting. Moreover, we show that despite the
limited e¢ ciency of exchange rate movements, a policy of pegging the center-
periphery exchange rate is suboptimal from the vantage point of limiting the
ability of a country to adjust some dimension of its prices.
Our analysis clearly demonstrates that the international role of a currency
is a central feature of international interdependence. While we deliberately
maintain a simple theoretical setup for clarity, our analysis can be extended
along many directions, First, the assumption of an exogenous structure of
invoicing can be relaxed to assess the joint determination of monetary policy
and invoicing strategy. Since we do not treat the microfounded motives of
invoicing choice in the current paper, our analysis does not assess whether in-
dividual producer welfare is higher as a consequence of his invoicing choices,
despite the observation that aggregate welfare may be lower along the dimen-
sion addressed by our model. Second, the assumption that all trade takes
place in ￿nal goods can be relexed. Introducing trade in intermediate goods
along a production chain spanning several countries is a promising avenue of
research. Third, while we assume that price rigidities apply to all goods, in
reality, the degree of price stickiness is higher for some goods, such as man-
ufacturing products, than other, such as commodities. If the international
role of a currency is concentrated among goods with relatively ￿ exible prices,
such as in commodity and raw material pricing, the magnitudes of the e⁄ects
we document are likely to be reduced. Finally, we focus on the ability of the
exchange rate to generate e¢ cient movements in international relative prices.
Our ￿nding that a peg is not optimal then abstracts from the extensive range
of other motives for having ￿xed exchange rates.
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29Table 1: Dimensions of the International Role of the Dollar 
      Share of Country Exports  Share of Country Imports 


















































Asia              
Japan   2001  52.8  30.4  51.5  70.0  18.3  51.8 
Korea   2001  84.9  20.8  49.0 82.2  15.9 45.5 
Malaysia   1996  66.0  18.2  31.6  66.0  15.5  22.2 
Thailand   1996  83.9  17.8  35.3  83.9  12.3  26.8 
Australia   2002  67.9  9.6  29.6  50.1  18.3  36.8 
European Union              
Belgium
a 2002  31.9  20.1  33.5  33.5  16.4  29.9 
France
a 2002  34.2  15.4  27.2  43.3  15.6  29.7 
Germany
a 2002  31.6  17.9  28.7  34.5  13.1  25.5 
Greece
a 2002  71.1  7.5  18.7  62.0  8.7  28.1 
Italy   2002  20.5  9.8  17.3  30.8  4.9  12.3 
Luxembourg
a 2002  35.7  10.4  17.8  38.0  15.3  19.6 
Portugal
a 2002  33.4  17.4  22.6  34.5  7.2  19.3 
Spain
a 2002  32.8  11.0  19.7  39.5  8.5  24.5 
United Kingdom   2002  26.0  15.5  22.2  37.0  11.9  21.3 
EU-Accession              
Bulgaria   2002  44.3  4.8  8.1  37.1  2.2  9.0 
Cyprus   2002  44.7  2.3  21.8  34.9  4.9  17.2 
Czech 2002  14.7  2.9  6.0  19.5  3.3  11.6 
Estonia   2003  8.5  2.3  7.7  22.0  2.9  13.3 
Hungary   2002  12.2  3.5  6.2  18.5  3.7  13.2 
Latvia   2002  32.1  4.3  7.4  32.1  1.6  4.6 
Poland   2002  29.9  2.7  7.6  28.6  3.3  10.0 
Slovakia   2002  11.6  1.4  3.5  21.2  2.1  6.5 
Slovenia   2002  9.6  2.8  5.2  13.3  2.9  6.2 
aInvoicing data and trade data refer only to “extra euro-area” trade.   
bDollar bloc countries are: Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, China, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherlands Antilles, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, St 
Vincent & the Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, Sudan, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad & Tobago, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yemen, 
and Zimbabwe. In the case that trade data to one of these countries is not available, reported trade shares do 
not include trade with that country in the numerator. Table 2: Dimensions of the International Role of the Euro 
      Share of Country Exports  Share of Country Imports 

















































Asia              
Japan   2001  8.0  12.5  13.4  3.0  9.8  10.8 
Korea   2001  1.3  10.4  12.2  1.1  8.3  9.3 
Malaysia   1996  2.8  8.8  9.5  6.8  10.2  10.9 
Thailand   1996  0.5  10.5  12.1  3.5  10.2  12.5 
Australia   2002  1.4  6.6  7.2  8.7  15.7  16.9 
European Union             
Belgium
a 2002  54.2  n/a  11.7  54.2  n/a  9.0 
France
a 2002  55.8  n/a  13.2  48.6  n/a  11.2 
Germany
a 2002  49.0  n/a  21.6  48.0  n/a  24.0 
Greece
a 2002  24.1  n/a  42.3  30.7  n/a  14.8 
Italy
a 2002  54.1  n/a  20.2  44.2  n/a  16.7 
Luxembourg
a 2002  49.1  n/a  14.6  37.4  n/a  8.2 
Portugal
a 2002  48.1  n/a  11.4  57.8  n/a  13.1 
Spain
a 2002  58.1  n/a  14.6  54.7  n/a  10.3 
United Kingdom   2002  21.0  52.5  57.6  27.0  46.8  51.8 
EU-Accession             
Bulgaria   2002  52.5  47.3  70.2  60.1  44.6  58.6 
Cyprus   2002  21.8  22.1  28.8  45.5  42.4  45.1 
Czech 2002  68.8  61.1  80.6  67.6  56.1  70.0 
Estonia   2003  70.4  39.1  57.3  61.7  40.1  54.1 
Hungary   2002  83.1  65.5  78.6  73.1  51.5  62.0 
Latvia   2002  47.7  29.1  52.1  47.7  40.8  69.4 
Poland   2002  60.2  57.6  74.1  59.6  53.4  64.6 
Slovakia   2002  73.9  56.6  88.1  60.1  46.4  70.1 
Slovenia   2002  86.9  55.1  83.7  82.8  64.0  80.0 
aInvoicing data and “euro bloc” trade data refer only to “extra euro-area” trade. 
For these countries, columns (3) and (6) show only the share sold to / bought from “Euro Bloc 
Countries” 
bEuro bloc countries are: Albania, Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Mali, Malta, Niger, Poland, Reunion (Thailand trade statistics only), Romania, San Marino, 
Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Togo, Turkey. In the case that trade data to one of these countries is 
not available, reported trade shares do not include trade with that country in the numerator. 
n/a: Not Applicable Figure 1: Five cases of invoicing
The letters denote the currency used for the invoicing of the corresponding trade flows
Symmetric cases
PCP-SYM LCP-SYM
Country A Country A
       B      C        A      A
A         A B         C
Country B B Country C Country B C Country C
CB
First dimension of the international role of currency A
DOL-PCP DOL-LCP
Country A Country A
       A      A        A      A
A         A A         A
Country B B Country C Country B C Country C
CB
Second dimension of the international role of currency A
DOL-DOL
Country A
       A      A
A         A
Country B A Country C
AFigure 3: Welfare under decentralized monetary policy
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Figure 2: World consumption change following
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Shocks are twice as volatile in country B as in country C
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Stable periphery country (C)Figure 5: Gain from cooperation
Welfare under cooperative policy - welfare under decentralized policy
Shocks are equally volatile in country B and C





0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
alpha (0.5: full integration, 1: disconnect)
First dimension of the 
international role
Second dimension of 
the international role










0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
alpha (0.5: full integration, 1: disconnect)
First dimension of the 
international role
Second dimension of 
the international roleFigure 6: Gain from cooperation, DOL-DOL case
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Figure 7: Worldwide welfare, second dimension
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